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This version: July 10, 2006 1 Introduction
This paper develops a model in which ￿rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of
entry to a ￿rm￿ there are no ￿cohort e⁄ects￿ ￿ and develops an equilibrium model of
wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of
worker risk aversion, and also mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any
time. Firms on the other hand are risk neutral and are committed to contracts. Firms
have to trade-o⁄ the desire to insure their risk-averse workers against the need to respond
to market conditions to not only prevent their workers from quitting but, because of equal
treatment of workers, also to take advantage of states of the world where labor is cheap.
We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment when the only exogenous variable
is productivity shocks, and show that real wages exhibit a downward stickiness, due to
the desire to insure incumbent workers. The equal treatment assumption prevents ￿rms
from cutting wages for new entrants, so that in periods with adverse shocks the wage may
not fall su¢ ciently to clear the labor market. We argue that even our rudimentary model,
when fed sectoral productivity shocks from the post-war U.S. economy, gives a reasonably
good account of unemployment and wage movements.
The idea that internal equity considerations can play a part in wage rigidity is by no
means novel. Truman Bewley has argued recently that it is a key feature constraining wage
cuts for new hires in recessions. In his story, because wage cuts for incumbents will have
such a negative impact on morale, ￿rms avoid them under all but extreme circumstance;
at the same time while new hires may be willing to work at a lower wage than that paid
to incumbents, paying them less would disrupt internal equity and so their wages will be
set at the same level as incumbents￿(controlling for experience, etc.):
New employees, in contrast, feel it is inequitable to be paid according to a
scale lower than the one that applied to colleagues that were hired earlier. For
this reason, downward pay rigidity for new hires exists only because the pay
of existing employees is rigid. (Bewley (1999b))
Bringing in workers at higher pay than incumbents is even more problematic; thus
while￿ in contrast to the primary sector￿ he found evidence that new hires are sometimes
paid a lower rate than incumbents in the secondary sector, even there, paying new hires
more than incumbents is deemed to be very disruptive (Bewley (1999a, p. 320)).
Bewley￿ s account mainly concentrates on the question of why ￿rms do not cut wages
in recession. But it raises the important question, which we attempt to answer, of how
1forward looking ￿rms take into account the fact that such constraints may arise in the
future: for example, a ￿rm, anticipating this downward wage rigidity, may temper wage
increases in better times. Or in more generality, and supposing that ￿rms can o⁄er long-
term contracts, the ￿rm must take into account these equal treatment constraints which
will prevent it bringing in new hires at a low wage in downturns, and also prevent the ￿rm
hiring at a higher wage than that o⁄ered to incumbents when the labor market is tight.
To our knowledge, the dynamic implications of equal treatment have not been analyzed
elsewhere.1
The linking of the pay of new hires to that of incumbents means that wage rigidity also
has real allocational implications. Obviously wage rigidity for incumbents need not imply
deviations from Arrow-Debreu outcomes so long as hiring is at the e¢ cient level (in our
model workers only separate for exogenous reasons). We show however that (under certain
conditions) ￿rms hire up to the point where the real wage equals the marginal product
of labor; to the extent then that wages do not correspond to market-clearing levels hiring
will be ine¢ cient; in fact we show that this occurs only in the direction of wages being
too high leading to ine¢ ciently low employment and an excess supply of labor.
The paper builds on the seminal contribution of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) (here-
after BD). They develop a model of labor contracting where a risk-neutral ￿rm o⁄ers
insurance to risk-averse employees but, following Holmstrom (1983), there is no worker
commitment (perfect mobility). Wages follow a ratchet-like process, rising when produc-
tivity is higher than previously, but staying constant otherwise; they show that the current
wage is determined by the tightest labor market during a worker￿ s tenure. In testing, this
perfect mobility model does better than two alternatives: a spot market model in which
current unemployment determines wages, and a full commitment model in which unem-
ployment at the time of hiring is the determining factor. Subsequent research (McDonald
and Worswick 1999, Grant 2003, Shin and Shin 2003, Devereux and Hart 2005) has largely
con￿rmed these results over di⁄erent periods and using di⁄erent datasets, although both
Grant, and Devereux and Hart, ￿nd more of a role for the current unemployment rate
than did BD. Although the economic environments are distinct, in essence our theoretical
model deviates from theirs only in the imposition of equal treatment.
In BD, without the equal treatment assumption, each worker is treated independently,
1Our model di⁄ers from Bewley￿ s account in that the motive to temper incumbent wage cuts arises
from to the desire to insure workers, rather than directly from worker morale considerations. We do not
view this contracting perspective to be necessarily inconsistent with his account however. The morale
e⁄ects due to wage cuts that he documents might be considered to be the response by the workforce to a
perception that the ￿rm has violated an implicit insurance contract: low worker morale might be regarded
as a punishment mechanism used to sustain the implicit contract.
2and the partial equilibrium analysis then boils down to a two-player game in which com-
petition forces pro￿ts to zero (given their constant returns to scale technology). It follows
that the labor market must always clear, since at the point of hiring there are no restric-
tions on wages. The downward wage rigidity in their perfect mobility model provides
insurance to the worker but does not directly a⁄ect employment decisions. Here, by con-
trast, we do not allow ￿rms to treat each worker separately, but each new cohort of hires
must ￿t into an existing wage structure. Even though we ￿nd that the characterization
of optimal contracts is in a number of respects similar to that in BD, the implications
for employment are very di⁄erent, as there will be episodes of involuntary unemployment.
We also show that although very robust, the estimated business cycle e⁄ect on wages
(i.e., through the minimum unemployment rate) in their estimations cannot explain very
much of the movement of wages over the sample we look at (an extension of the one they
examine). On the other hand, wage movements predicted by our model can explain much
of this.
The idea that equal treatment can lead to wage rigidity has been argued in a union
context by Carruth and Oswald (1987) and Gottfries (1992). In these papers, outsiders
have reservation wages below any wage that insiders might receive even in ￿good￿states
of the world. Wages are kept constant in the face of rising demand to prevent too much
surplus leaking to outsiders. More closely related, Thomas (2005) considers an essentially
static model with risk neutral workers and unveri￿able states; in combination with equal
treatment this can lead to wage-stickiness across states in a given period (but not as here,
over time).
There is little direct empirical evidence on the issue of equal treatment. The principal
exception is a study of pay discrimination by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who
examined the pay of managerial employees in a single ￿rm over time. They found that
incumbents￿pay tends to move together, but the pay of entrants is signi￿cantly more
variable, suggesting that the pay of new hires may be more subject to outside conditions
than that of incumbents. However, as discussed above, survey evidence in Bewley (1999a)
suggests that violations of equal treatment are unusual, particularly in the primary sector.
Similar ￿ndings exist for other countries: ￿Managers responded that hiring underbidders
would violate their internal wage policy￿ (Agell and Lundborg (1999, p.7), based on a
Swedish survey); in a British survey, Kaufman (1984) reported that almost all managers
viewed bringing in similarly quali￿ed workers at lower wage rates as ￿infeasible.￿Akerlof
and Yellen (1990) argue that personnel management texts treat the need for equitable pay
as virtually self-evident.
3It is possible to derive some version of equal treatment from primitive hypotheses.
For example, Moore (1983) shows that if it is necessary to retain at least one worker
to train the new employees, then there is a unique von Neumann-Morgernstern stable
set consisting of con￿gurations in which all workers receive the same wage. We adopt a
similar approach using the idea that pay di⁄erences may be exploited by employers to
replace more expensive workers by cheaper ones, and that it is di¢ cult to distinguish
between voluntary quits and ￿res, or alternatively, labor law requires contracts to be ￿at
will￿ , so either party can dissolve the relationship without penalty (but, crucially, not vary
the wage).
An outline of the paper is as follows. The model is presented and solved in Section 2.
In 2.3 we show that equal treatment arises in equilibrium if labor contracts are ￿at will.￿
Empirical evidence is considered in Section 3: in 3.1 we outline our strategy for using
sectoral TFP data from the postwar US economy to simulate the model and generate
predictions of unemployment movements; in 3.2 we argue that a simulated wage from our
model gives a reasonable account for macroeconomic wage movements, and although we
con￿rm BD￿ s ￿ndings over a longer sample than they study, their approach cannot account
for aggregate wage ￿ uctuations. Finally Section 4 contains concluding comments.
2 The model
The model is as follows. There is a horizon T, t = 1;2;3:::T, where T ￿ 2 may be ￿nite
or in￿nite, and a single consumption good each period. All workers are assumed to be
identical, apart from the date of entry into the economy (we abstract from any tenure
or experience e⁄ects on productivity). Workers are risk averse with per period twice
di⁄erentiable utility function u(w); u0 > 0;u00 < 0; where w is the income/consumption
received within the period; it is assumed that they cannot make credit market transactions.
There is no disutility of work, but hours are ￿xed so that workers are either employed or
unemployed. Assume that if workers are not employed in a period, they receive some low
consumption level c ￿ 0: There is a large (but ￿xed) number of identical risk-neutral ￿rms.
The ￿rm has a diminishing returns technology where output is f(N;st) with @f=@N >
0;@2f=@N2 < 0; where N is labor input and st is the current productivity shock (the sole
source of ￿ uctuations). It is assumed that a ￿rm must always employ some (minimum
measure of) workers each period.2 Workers and ￿rms discount the future with respective
factors ￿w;￿f 2 (0;1): There is an exogenous separation probability of (1￿￿), ￿ 2 (0;1);
each period, and separated workers must seek work elsewhere. Separation occurs at the end
2This can be motivated by an assumption that ￿rms cannot produce after a period of zero production.
4of a period so that separated workers who ￿nd a job in the following period do not su⁄er
unemployment. Moreover, there are a large number of workers relative to the number of
￿rms, and we normalize the ratio of workers to ￿rms to be one each period.3 We assume
that the ￿spot wage￿solution is always greater than the unemployment consumption level:
@F=@N(1;st) > c all t:
The state of nature (productivity) st follows a Markov process, with initial value
s1; and countable state space S, but assume that from any state s only a ￿nite number
of states r 2 S are reachable next period with transition probabilities: ￿sr > 0.4 Let
ht ￿ (s1;s2;:::;st) be the history at t. While the ￿rm is committed to contracts, workers
are not (although we relax this later). The labor market o⁄ers a worker currently looking
for work (at the start of t) a utility (discounted to t) of ￿t = ￿(ht). We assume symmetry
between the situation of a worker who is currently employed and one who is searching
for work, by assuming that a worker who either is separated from, or quits, their current
employer at t gets ￿(ht). Thus a ￿rm must o⁄er at least ￿(ht) to prevent its workers from
quitting, and this is also the minimum utility that must be o⁄ered to hire: We assume
that the ￿rm can hire any number of workers by o⁄ering at least ￿t (and cannot hire
otherwise). So the labor market is modelled as being competitive.
Our strategy will be to construct an equilibrium under the working hypothesis that
￿rms hire each period (so they replace at least some of those who are separated), and then
later we will ￿nd a restriction on parameters under which hiring does indeed always occur.
This working hypothesis will also imply that we can ignore layo⁄s, but formally we will
state the optimization problem imposing no layo⁄s, to avoid complicating the statement of
the problem. Then we shall construct the hiring equilibrium as a solution to this problem.
Finally it will follow that the hiring equilibrium is also a solution to a problem in which
layo⁄s are permitted.5
We work with a representative ￿rm, and we shall use a ￿ superscript to denote equi-
librium values. At the start of date 1; after s1 is observed, ￿rms commit to contracts
(wt(ht))
T
t=1 = (w1(h1);w2(h2);w3(h3);:::), wt (ht) ￿ 0, which we assume are not binding
on workers. We assume equal treatment: a worker joining subsequently, at ￿ after history
3Thus we take the fraction of a ￿rm￿ s workforce leaving to be exactly (1 ￿ ￿). If N was ￿nite, then
the fraction leaving a ￿rm would be random, and it can be shown that the contract could be improved by
conditioning on this. (An alternative assumption to N large would be to simply rule out contracts that
condition on this fraction on the grounds that veri￿cation may be impossible.)
4We use a Markov process to ￿x ideas, although the arguments go through for more general stochastic
processes.
5Thus given that the rate of separation is exogenous, movements in unemployment occur through
changes in hiring. This is consistent with the evidence reviewed in Hall (2005) that shows that the
separation rate is roughly constant. Although job losses rise during recessions, the increase is usually very
small in relation to the normal levels of separations.
5h￿, is o⁄ered a continuation of this same contract: (w￿(h￿); w￿+1(h￿;s￿+1);w￿+2(h￿;s￿+1;
s￿+2);:::). (This is to be contrasted with the case where discrimination is permitted: in
that case a worker joining at ￿ is o⁄ered a contract which in principle may be unrelated
to that o⁄ered to previous cohorts.) Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t
onwards from the contract:












where E denotes expectation, and the term involving ￿t0 re￿ ects the utility after exogenous
separation. Each ￿rm also has a planned employment path (Nt(ht))
T
t=1, where Nt (ht) ￿ 0:













Vt (ht) ￿ ￿(ht) (2)
for all positive probability ht;T ￿ t ￿ 1, and
Nt(ht￿1;s) ￿ ￿Nt￿1(ht￿1) (3)
for all positive probability ht￿1; all s 2 S with ￿st￿1s > 0; T ￿ t ￿ 2. (2) is the
participation constraint that says that at any point in the future the contract must o⁄er
at least what a worker can get by quitting, while (3) imposes that the ￿rm may not layo⁄
workers.6
The outside option is determined by the following in a symmetric equilibrium:
￿t = N￿
t (ht)V ￿
t (ht) + (1 ￿ N￿
t (ht))Ut(ht) (4)





; i.e., the utility from the reservation wage plus future utility from
not having a job at the beginning of t + 1.7 There are two cases: if the labor market at
time t clears, N￿
t (ht) = 1, then from (4) it must o⁄er the utility o⁄ered by other ￿rms. In
6More precisely, (3) implies layo⁄s are not needed. However the de￿nition of Vt(ht) in (1) implies that
a worker remains with the ￿rm unless exogenously separated, so together these two assumptions rule out
layo⁄s. We show in the Appendix that our solution is robust to allowing layo⁄s.
7Clearly ￿t ￿ Ut(ht), since remaining unemployed is an option for workers (i.e., if V
￿
t (ht) < Ut(ht)
then no workers would accept jobs and N
￿
t (ht) = 0). So if Vt(ht) ￿ ￿t; unemployed workers are not better
o⁄ refusing a job.
6symmetric equilibrium, other ￿rms are o⁄ering an identical contract, and so it is the utility
associated with this, V ￿
t (ht); which must be o⁄ered. If, on the other hand, there is excess
supply of labor,8 N￿
t (ht) < 1, the outside opportunity will depend on the probability of
getting a job, N￿
t (ht). (Recall that quitters, those exogenously separated at the end of
the previous period, and the unemployed from the previous period, are all in the same
position.)
Necessary conditions for an optimal contract can be characterized with the help of a
simple variational argument. This is the central idea explaining why there is a lower bound
on the fall of real wages; even if the labor market is slack at t + 1, the ￿rm will not want
to cut the wage too far because of the desire to insure incumbents. Once this point is
reached, the wage will not fall faster no matter how low the supply price of outside workers
(i.e., new hires will strictly want to work for the ￿rm in this case). Suppose we are at ht;
let Nt and Ns
t+1 denote the optimal employment levels after ht and (ht;s) respectively,
and consider, starting from the optimal contract, reshu› ing wages between t, and t + 1
in state s; to backload them. Increase the wage at t + 1 after state s by a small amount
￿; and cut the wage at t by x so as to leave the worker indi⁄erent; do not change the
contract otherwise:
￿sts￿￿wu0 (wt+1(ht;s))￿ ￿ u0 (wt(ht))x ’ 0:
This backloading satis￿es all participation constraints since worker utility rises at t + 1;
and so from this point on constraints are satis￿ed, but also after ht and earlier since utility
is held constant over the two periods. The change in pro￿ts (viewed from ht) is
￿￿sts￿fNs













Since the change in pro￿ts cannot be positive by optimality of the original contract, (5)
must hold: marginal utility growth cannot exceed a certain amount. Conversely, the
reverse argument (frontloading), which would be pro￿table if the strict version of (5)
holds, cannot be undertaken (only) if next period￿ s participation constraint binds since
utility falls at t + 1; so the constraint would be violated. We summarize the necessary
condition:
8Intuitively, the case of excess demand for labour cannot arise in equilibrium, as an in￿nitessimally
small increase in the wage would cure the individual ￿rm￿ s supply problem. In contrast, because of equal
treatment the case of excess supply can arise since workers cannot undercut.
7Lemma 1 In an optimal contract with perfect mobility, (5) must hold; it can only hold
strictly (<) if the participation constraint binds at (ht;s):
A way then to think about the evolution of an optimal contract is that there is a








which will be maintained, unless a binding participation constraint at t+1 forces it to be
lower. Put di⁄erently, this puts a lower bound on how fast real wages can decline, but a
tight labor market at t + 1 can imply that wage growth is not against this bound. Note
that this lemma applies whether or not the ￿rm is hiring at t or t + 1.
It is instructive to compare this with the BD model (in this context) which has
symmetric discounting, so assume that ￿f = ￿w. The corresponding target (gross) ￿growth
rate￿in their model is 1: wages stay constant unless a binding participation constraint
forces them to be higher. The only di⁄erence arises here because the term Ns
t+1=Nt￿
re￿ ects the number of new hires that will be made next period for each incumbent at t.
The reason is the following: if discrimination is allowed (as in BD) then each worker is
treated independently, so the risk-neutral ￿rm would like to fully insure each worker by
holding wages constant.9 In the equal treatment model, wages would likewise be constant
if the term Ns
t+1=Nt￿ = 1, that is, if none of the workers who separate are replaced. In
this case the ￿rm is only having to deal with the incumbents, so this corresponds to the
discrimination case. Whenever Ns
t+1=Nt￿ > 1, however, the ￿rm is taking on additional
workers at t+1 who will receive the same wage as the incumbents; hence the future wage
is taken into account with a larger weight by the ￿rm than by the incumbent worker, and
this imparts a downward bias to the future wage in comparison with the discrimination
case.
To proceed, assume provisionally that ￿rms always hire (at all ht) in equilibrium. That
is to say, we proceed on the supposition that the constraint (3) in problem A never binds
in the solution. We characterize the solution if this is the case, and later ￿nd conditions on
a speci￿c parametrization for which the solution satis￿es this property. Finally we verify
that this is also a solution to the original problem.
Then employment is determined by a standard marginal productivity equation:
9The exogenous separation probability a⁄ects ￿rm and worker equally￿ the ￿rm only has to pay the
agreed upon wage next period with probability ￿ (times ￿stst+1) and the worker only receives the wage
with the same probability￿ so it nets out.




t (ht);st)=@N = w￿
t(ht): (7)
Proof. Suppose that @F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N > w￿
t(ht): It is feasible to increase current
hiring holding the wage contract constant, and consider this as the only change to the
￿rm￿ s plan: An increase in current hiring by ￿ > 0, for ￿ small enough, and holding the
wage constant at w￿
t(ht), would lead to an increase in current pro￿ts. At the same time,
holding employment at t+1 constant at N￿
t+1(ht+1) in all states (so hiring falls by ￿￿), is
feasible for ￿ small enough given hiring is positive at t + 1. Thus there is an increase in
pro￿ts at t; and no change at other dates, contradicting pro￿t maximization. A symmetric
argument, using the fact that current hiring is positive so current hiring can be reduced




Suppose that at some t; the participation constraint binds. Then there must be full
employment and the wage is determined by marginal productivity at full employment:
Lemma 3 Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which hiring always occurs; then the par-
ticipation constraint binds at ht if and only if N￿
t (ht) = 1; moreover if the constraint binds
then w￿
t(ht) = @F(1;st)=@N:
Proof. (i) Suppose ￿rst that the participation constraint binds,
V ￿
t (ht) = ￿(st); (8)
and suppose contrary to the lemma that N￿
t (ht) < 1: Under the hiring hypothesis, we
know from Lemma 2 that @F(N￿
t (ht);st)=@N = w￿
t(ht) > c by the assumption on c and
diminishing marginal productivity (i.e., w￿
t(ht) ￿ c would imply N￿
t (ht) > 1). Likewise, at
any t0 it is not possible that w￿
t0(ht0) ￿ c since there is no feasible employment level (N ￿ 1)
for which @F(N;st)=@N ￿ c, and so Lemma 2 would be contradicted. Consequently, a
worker who gets a job at t receives strictly more current utility than the utility from
being unemployed, and in the future receives no less no matter when (or if) she would
get a job if unemployed today, given that she would receive w￿
￿(h￿) regardless of when
she was hired; consequently an unemployed worker is strictly worse o⁄ than an employed.
Hence quitting at t will lead to a utility strictly less than V ￿
t (ht) as there is a positive
probability of unemployment. This contradicts (8). The equilibrium wage follows directly
from Lemma 2. (ii) Now suppose that N￿
t (ht) = 1: Since all workers are employed, ￿t (ht)
is de￿ned to be equal to V ￿
t (ht); so the participation constraint binds.
9We de￿ne w￿
s = @F(1;s)=@N; which in view of the above lemma is the equilibrium
wage when the participation constraint binds in state s. Then we can summarize: in a
symmetric equilibrium with hiring, if at t + 1 the participation constraint isn￿ t binding,




To proceed to an explicit solution, in order to facilitate the empirical analysis, we put
more structure on the problem.10 This will allow us to assert that the wage updating
rule is of the following simple form: given w￿
t compute wt+1 under the hypothesis that
the participation constraint at t + 1 is not binding; if wt+1 > w￿
st+1 then the hypothesis
is con￿rmed and wt+1 is the equilibrium wage; otherwise the constraint is binding and
the equilibrium wage will be at w￿
st+1. The structure will also allow us to demonstrate
su¢ cient conditions for the symmetric hiring equilibrium to exist.
From henceforth assume each ￿rm has technology given by, at time t,
F(N;st) = Mt + atN1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿); (9)
where ￿ > 0, ￿ 6= 1, Mt ￿ 0 and for ￿ < 1, Mt = 0. (Mt;at) will evolve according
to a Markov process, with ￿f;￿w < min
￿
E[at+1=at j Mt;at]￿1;E[Mt+1=Mt j Mt;at]￿1￿
.
Note that for ￿ > 1, F has an upper bound given by Mt, which given that we are
modelling short-run production functions at the establishment or plant level, may be
appropriate. We also assume henceforth that workers have per-period utility functions
of the constant relative risk aversion family with coe¢ cient ￿ > 0, ￿ 6= 1, described by
u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿).11 Finally we assume that ￿￿ > 1.












￿f . Under the hiring assumption, we also have that the marginal product of
labor equals atN￿￿








Combining (10) and (11) yields an equation for the evolution of wages if unconstrained at

















10Essentially we need the problem faced by the ￿rm to be concave; concave production and utility
functions are not su¢ cient to guarantee this.
11For ￿ = 1, we can specify F(N;st) = Mt+log(N), and for ￿ = 1, u(c) = log(c); all results go through.
10where the function ￿(:) simpli￿es notation. Moreover if ￿rms are constrained at t+1, then
as Nt+1 = 1, wt+1 = w￿
st+1 = at+1 (from Lemma 3). We can now state















Proof. We have just shown that w￿
t+1 must equal one of the arguments of the
max operator, depending on whether or not the participation constraint binds at t +














. Suppose that the participation constraint binds at t + 1
(so w￿



























. So we have a contradic-





















t = at+1; then whether the participation constraint either binds or
does not, w￿
t+1 equals this common value. To show that w￿
1 = a1; note that in an optimal
contract the participation constraint binds at the initial date (t = 1): if it did not, the
￿rm would increase pro￿ts by cutting w1(s1) holding the remainder of the contract ￿xed,
and would still satisfy all participation constraints. Thus by Lemma 3 N￿
t (ht) = 1, so
w￿
1 = a1.
It should be stressed that (13) must hold in a symmetric equilibrium in which hiring
always takes place; i.e., it is a necessary condition.
2.1.1 A Numerical Example
We present a two period example (t = 1;2). Suppose that f (N;at) = atLogN where at
is the state of productivity at time t; with a1 = 1; and a2 taking values 1:1 and 0:9; each
with probability 0:5; so productivity growth is ￿10%. Workers have a utility function
u(w) = ￿w￿1; and c = 0:7. Assume there is symmetric discounting and that the survival
probability ￿ is 0:87.
A spot market solution ~ wt would solve @f (N;at)=@N = wt at N = 1 (full employ-
ment), so that ~ wt = at. From the analysis below, the only di⁄erence in the equilibrium with
11￿rm commitment and equal treatment, (w￿
t)
2
t=1 ; is that w￿
2(0:9) = 0:966 > 0:9 = ~ wt (0:9);
i.e., the wage in the bad state at t = 2 does not fall su¢ ciently to clear the labor market.
Employment is determined by the standard wage equal marginal productivity condition,
so that there is employment of 0:93 in the bad state, i.e., an unemployment rate of 7%;
but full employment in the good state (and in period 1). Any attempt to cut w￿
2(0:9) will
lead to an increase in overall wage costs because the need to compensate period 1 hires for
the extra wage variability more than o⁄sets the fact that period 2 hires would be cheaper.
2.2 Parameter values for which hiring equilibrium exists
















When will the hiring condition (14) be satis￿ed, and when does the model predict outcomes












t ; if ￿rms
are constrained at t+1 then N = 1 and hiring is positive; if they are not, then (12) holds,














Consequently, provided (15) holds for all states reachable with positive probability from
(any) at that occurs with positive probability, the wage path, given by (13), with associated
employment levels given by (11), is an equilibrium. For ￿w = ￿f, condition (15) requires
that the maximum rate of fall of productivity should be smaller than the exogenous
turnover rate raised to the power of ￿.
To see when outcomes di⁄er from spot outcomes, starting from full employment in
some state at, we need the wage to fall by less than the spot wage. Thus we need, using


















￿ < 1 (from ￿￿ > 1), (15) and (16) are compatible: there exist shocks
at+1
at
su¢ ciently small (￿bad￿ ) that the contract wage does not fall enough to maintain full
employment, but not su¢ ciently small that hiring falls to zero.
Although we have found a unique solution to the necessary conditions under the
hiring assumption, we have not yet shown that if this solution satis￿es (14), then this
12is su¢ cient for it to be an equilibrium. This is established in Appendix A. where we
consider a relaxed version of the problem faced by a potential deviant ￿rm and show that
this cannot improve on the putative equilibrium; it follows that a deviant cannot do better
in a more constrained version.
2.3 Endogenizing the Equal Treatment Constraint
So far we have simply imposed equal treatment as a constraint. In the absence of this
constraint, a ￿rm will o⁄er a lower cost contract to new hires in bad states of the world than
the continuation of incumbents￿contracts. Suppose however that courts cannot distinguish
between a voluntary quit and one that is enforced by the employer, for example by making
working conditions unpleasant, or alternatively by dismissing workers on the basis of minor
contract violations. Alternatively it may be that the law stipulates that employment
contracts must be ￿at will￿ .12 Thus we assume that a worker￿ s contract speci￿es wages
over time, but either ￿rm or worker can terminate it at any point. Then the ￿rm will have
an incentive to replace incumbents by cheaper new hires in bad states. Given that workers
will anticipate this, it does not follow that the ability to pay discriminate is advantageous
to ￿rms.
In Appendix B we show that if pay discrimination occurs, the e⁄ect of a cohort being
ousted by a cheaper one can be replicated by a contract in which the incumbent cohort is
retained but paid according to the continuation of the new hires￿contract; since the new
hires￿contract must satisfy the participation constraint, and since the incumbents who
are ousted at t in this fashion will receive exactly ￿t, the incumbents cannot be worse o⁄.
(New hires brought in at on a di⁄erent contract than that of incumbents can be allocated
a continuation of the latter contract.) In this manner a new contract satisfying equal
treatment can be constructed which is at least as good as the original contract which does
not satisfy equal treatment. Hence a ￿rm cannot su⁄er by committing to equal treatment,
and we can show that the solution to the model derived above remains an equilibrium in
an environment with no equal treatment requirement but with at-will contracts.
A related argument has been made in the insider-outsider context by, amongst others,
Gottfries (1992) (see also Carmichael (1983) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)).13
12The doctrine of at-will employment recognises ￿that where an employment was for an inde￿nite term,
an employer may discharge an employee ￿ for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong￿ .￿ (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1983).
13Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) allow the ￿rm to ￿x a termination payment for workers, payable irre-
spective of who initiates termination, which in principle should allow outsiders to be brought in at lower
pay without creating incentives for replacement of insiders; on the other hand it increases turnover as
13There is some evidence for this concern existing among incumbent workers when faced
with the possibility of two-tier wages, see, e.g., Bewley (1999a, p. 146).
2.4 Worker Commitment
We assumed that workers are not committed to contracts, and hence it is the ex post
mobility of workers which drives the wage dynamics. Suppose we drop the assumption
that workers can costlessly quit the ￿rm, for example by assuming that there is a mobility
cost su⁄ered if a worker changes jobs. Because of equal treatment, very little changes. If
there is a symmetric equilibrium with mobility costs in which ￿rms hire every period, then
it must be identical to a symmetric hiring equilibrium with ex post mobility since the same
participation constraint needs to be satis￿ed each period￿ if the continuation contract
o⁄ers enough to hire a new worker, then it will also o⁄er enough to prevent a worker from
leaving. However the converse may not be true: an equilibrium with fully mobile workers
may not be one with mobility costs. It may pay ￿rms to choose not to hire in some
periods (to avoid increases in wages) and let Vt (ht) fall below ￿(ht). In the mobility case
a ￿rm doing this will lose its incumbent workers too, something by assumption it wants
to avoid. The two cases will coincide if however we additionally assumed that a ￿rm must
always hire some workers to replace separated workers; this could be justi￿ed if there are
￿ key￿workers who cannot be replaced by reallocating incumbents and new workers must
be hired and trained in these jobs; hence the participation constraint must be satis￿ed at
each date.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we examine the evidence in support of our theory using both unbalanced
panel data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) and macroeconomic data
from the Bureau for Labor Statistics (BLS). We start by assessing the success of our theory
in explaining unemployment. Then we use the PSID to assess the relative success of BD￿ s
empirically successful contracting model and our own in explaining macroeconomic wage
movements over the cycle.
insiders are more willing to leave. It is shown that the turnover e⁄ect may stop the ￿rm from o⁄ering
termination payments. A similar argument can be made here if we allow for on-the-job search (which does
not, per se, a⁄ect our equilibrium) so that termination payments may induce incumbents who ￿nd a job
elsewhere to leave, and if we introduce su¢ ciently convex turnover costs.
143.1 Macroeconomic Evidence: US Postwar Unemployment
In this subsection we assess how well our model ￿ts US post war aggregate unemployment
data from the BLS and the US Abstract of Statistics. In the one sector model studied
above, unemployment falls to zero whenever the productivity shock is not too bad. Using
a multisector model in which each sector is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
we will obtain more realistic unemployment levels because it is less likely that all labor
markets will simultaneously clear; moreover when the aggregate productivity shock is
positive, there will be more sectors with low unemployment and consequently aggregate
employment is likely to be lower. Naturally this exercise depends on how well correlated
the sectoral shocks are.
In order to get some realistic predictions from our model, we use actual U.S. man-
ufacturing industry multifactor productivity processes for 17 sectors plus a residual non
manufacturing sector, as provided by the BLS and then aggregate the model￿ s predictions
made for each of these sectors. This simultaneously ￿xes the degree of shock correlation,
and also allows us to generate simulated unemployment and wage series which can be
directly compared to the data. We make the extreme assumption that each sector is oth-
erwise independent, so that the sectoral labor markets are completely segmented.14 As we
shall see, even though the model is lightly parametrized (two degrees of freedom for wages
and three for unemployment), feeding it these sectoral shocks leads to unemployment and
wage predictions that correspond reasonably well to the data.
As Proposition 4 makes clear, given knowledge of the model￿ s parameters, given an
initial time period where there was full employment and given a TFP series it is possible
to generate the sectoral ￿real wage￿ series that would be predicted by our theory. We
note that we are able to solve the model on this basis because of the convenient property
that the solution depends only on actual realizations of the random processes, and not
on their distributions. It is then possible to derive the corresponding implications for
unemployment (rates).
We generate separate predicted wage and unemployment series for 17 manufactur-
ing sectors and one residual non manufacturing ￿ sector￿ , and then aggregate using each
sector￿ s employment shares. To implement our simulations we need to calibrate the rate
of change in real wages when ￿rms are unconstrained (and productivity is unchanged),
14We use this data as it is the only sectoral TFP series available for such a long time scale and collected
on a consistent basis; TFP data for other broad sectors such as services are only available from the early
70￿ s onwards. It is also extreme to assume that these sectors map exactly into genuinely distinct and
separate labor markets. Nonetheless we work with what is available to us and accept that what we are
able to do will be more of an indicative rather than rigorous empirical exercise.
15￿
￿
￿￿￿1; and ￿ and ￿, the parameters governing (relative) risk aversion and the curvature
of the production function respectively. For the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿; we
use the value 1.2 which is in the standard range for simulations and for ￿ we use 1.4. This
translates to a short-run elasticity of demand for labor of approximately -0.7. Estevªo
and Wilson (1998) analyzing BLS manufacturing data for a similar period that we study,
found a short-run demand elasticity ranging between close to zero and -0.71 with aggregate
data, and of between -0.5 and -0.89 at the 4-digit industry level for manufacturing.15 In
fact the wage solution depends only on two composite parameters, ￿￿ and ￿
￿
￿￿￿1. Thus
varying ￿ and ￿ but keeping their product constant does not a⁄ect the solution for wages
provided we hold ￿
￿
￿￿￿1 constant; the unemployment series will vary with ￿1=￿ however,
as this measures the elasticity of labor demand by which wt=at > 1 (i.e., the extent to
which wages are too high for market clearing) translates into unemployment. Thus a
lower value for ￿ will magnify ￿ uctuations in sectoral unemployment. We set ￿
￿
￿￿￿1 to be
0:98 (equivalently, ￿ ￿ :99), which will lead to a distribution (depending on productivity
shocks) of real wage declines when the constraint is not binding centred around 2% per
year.16;17 Individual predicted wage series were generated for each of the 17 two digit
manufacturing sectors for which TFP data are available from the BLS and for the residual
sector (whose TFP is constructed as the weighted di⁄erence of total nonfarm business
TFP and manufacturing TFP, all in logs). Treating each sector as a separate economy
we used the model and the relevant TFP series to generate a simulated unemployment
series for each sector. An aggregate unemployment index was then constructed as the
weighted average of the individual sector simulations with weights given by employment
15Hamermesh (1993) reports that a lower elasticity, around ￿0:3, is typical.
16Elsby (2005) charts the distribution of real wage changes in the PSID over a relatively low in￿ ation
period (so surprise in￿ ation is less likely to lead to unanticipated real wage falls), 1983-1992; real wage
falls rarely exceed about 6%, with a spike around 2-4%. Given that the data includes displaced workers
who will receive wage cuts in their new jobs, our choice of the upper end of this range seems reasonable.
Likewise Christophides and Stengos (Apr 2003) ￿nd from Canadian wage contract data in the unionized
sector that most real wage reductions in the 1990s were of the order of 1-2%.
17Alternatively we could calibrate this term by calibrating its constituent parts ￿f;￿w;￿;￿ and ￿.
Certainly, given that annual turnover in the PSID is as high as 30%, this is likely to lead to a lower
value for ￿
￿
￿￿￿1, which in turn would make labor markets more likely to clear. On the other hand, a
richer thory would be likely to lead to a number of o⁄setting elements. First, plant turnover, from which
we abstracted, would have the opposite e⁄ect from worker turnover on the target wage change. Secondly,
it may be that much of the observed turnover is intentional in the sense workers are planning to leave
when an appropriate opportunity comes along (particularly in the secondary sector) and are unlikely to
be retained even by an appropriate wage policy. Such turnover should not enter into the expression for
target wage growth. It is actually only separations which are unanticipated by workers who are not in the
above category which matters for determing the target wage growth. (This can be seen in an extreme case;
suppose that 30% of the workforce plans to leave at the end of the current period, to be replaced, and
the other 70% will stay if wages are as good as elsewhere. Then the wage would in fact stay constant￿ if
￿f = ￿w and assuming next period￿ s participation constraint does not bind￿ since both stayers and the
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Figure 1: Actual versus model unemployment rates, 1955-2001.
shares.18 The results for actual aggregate unemployment and model unemployment are
graphed in Figure 1. The simulated model unemployment series appears to do quite well.
In particular the volatility of actual unemployment is reasonably well matched as are the
peaks and troughs of the actual series. Finally regressing actual unemployment (u) on the
model predicted unemployment (b u) gives (standard errors in brackets):
ut = const + :734b ut R2 = :42 t = 1955;:::;2001:
(:128)
This con￿rms what Figure 1 indicates, namely that there is a highly signi￿cant rela-
tionship between the actual and predicted series19. Finally as a robustness check on the
correlation coe¢ cient between u and b u of 0:65; we allowed ￿ to vary between 0:98 and
0.995, ￿;￿ between 1:1 and 2, and found that the correlation coe¢ cient varies between
0:59 and 0:66.
3.2 Macroeconomic Evidence from the PSID
We now assess the ability of the model￿ s predicted wage series￿ using the same calibra-
tion as above￿ to explain movements in aggregate wages garnered from the PSID. One
18The (￿xed) employment weights were taken from the middle year of the sample and the manufacturing
sector as a whole was assumed to be 50% larger than the residual sector - roughly consistent with the average
relative actual sizes over the period.
19We have added 4% to our simulated series to allow for a constant level of frictional unemployment.
17advantage of using the PSID for this purpose is that it was used by BD and this allows us
to replicate their analysis (Appendix C con￿rms their results on our longer sample) and
assess the relative success of their key variable against our model prediction in explaining
macro wage movements. Another advantage is that the aggregate annual wage we extract
has been purged of the e⁄ects of changes from year to year in worker characteristics. By
contrast the BLS aggregate wage series may move purely because of compositional changes
of the working labor force over the business cycle. Given that our theory makes predic-
tions for a representative individual the PSID panel is in many ways more appropriate
benchmark target than is the BLS aggregate data.20 There is a problem with this however.
Our theory explains macroeconomic movements in wages purely in terms of productivity
shocks. A glance at Figure 2 shows that between 1968 and 1993 real wages (non farm
private sector) and aggregate TFP (likewise private nonfarm) have opposite trends￿ real
wages fall whilst TFP rises￿ a general feature of postwar US data. But as is well known,
there is an increasing discrepancy between total (wage plus nonwage) compensation and
wages, due largely to sharp rises in company medical and pension, etc. bene￿ts. If we
look at total worker compensation (Figure 2 again) we see this clearly. Interestingly total
compensation has roughly the same trend as TFP. In our model wages are driven largely
by the demand for labor, which depends on total compensation not just its wage element.
In what follows therefore we adjust annual real wage measures extracted from the PSID
to allow for non wage compensation. As a ￿nal check on our empirical results we attempt
to match the model￿ s wage predictions with wage estimates from the PSID allowing for
di⁄erent trends via detrending and as we shall see it does not substantially a⁄ect our main
results.
We collected data from the PSID for the years 1968 to 1993￿ encompassing the BD
years of 1976-84. We collected data on private sector employees￿hourly wage and a basic
set of characteristics: gender, age, education, occupation, tenure (in months), race and
state of residence. For the macro variates we use the annual CPI and monthly aggregate
unemployment rates as reported by the BLS. Whilst we did not collect data on all of the
BD characteristics21 we have arguably the most important and most frequently recorded
ones. Unlike BD (but not Grant (2003)) we do not exclude women and individuals who
were in the workforce prior to 1947￿ this re￿ ects our desire to be as comprehensive as
possible in order to be able to generate macroeconomic results using the data later on.
The di⁄erences in data collection make it impossible for us to replicate BD￿ s results
20The BLS Employment Cost Index represents an attempt to measure year to year wage movements
whilst controlling for changes in the year to year composition of the labour force. However this series starts
relatively recently and a complete set of ECI ￿gures are unavailable for the years in our sample.














Figure 2: Logs of TFP, real wages and total compensation, 1955-2002
exactly but we check whether the broad features of our sample are in line with theirs, and
in Appendix C we report results con￿rming their basic ￿ndings over our longer sample.
Table 1 gives sample means and standard errors of our and BD￿ s main variates for the BD
years. The table shows that we have nearly 30% more data points than do BD and that
average wages in our sample are around 11% lower than in BD. Both of these di⁄erences are
largely though not wholly down to the inclusion of women (excluding women, for example,
gives an average log wage less than 2% below BD￿ s). Average tenure is a little higher in
BD but their key variable, minimum unemployment rate during job tenure (henceforth we
refer to this variable as just ￿minu￿ ) is rather lower than in our data. We should expect
some di⁄erences here as we did not adopt BD￿ s adjustment method. Instead we simply
use the PSID variate ￿number of months with current employer￿without adjustment.22
Table 1: Data Means and Standard Deviations
Our Sample 1976-1984 BD￿ S Sample
Log of Real Wages 1.01 1.12
(.003) (.004)
Min u 4.6% 4.2%
(.009) (.013)
Months in Post (Tenure) 81.7 83.0
(.57) (.66)
Percent White 37% 32%
(.003) (.003)
The predicted wage series for 1968-1993 from our model was an input into the analysis
22For 1968 to 1974 the only tenure related question in the PSID refers to length of time in job rather
than with employer which is somewhat ambiguous.
19of unemployment undertaken above. (Recall that it was a weighted average of the model￿ s
predicted wages for 17 manufacturing sectors and a residual sector.) To apply PSID data
to our macro analysis we must do two things. First, because it reports wages not total
compensation, some adjustment must be made when matching it with our simulated series.
Second one has to take control for the e⁄ect of the changes in yearly characteristics (e.g.,
the proportion of professionals in the year) which vary quite markedly over the sample
years. We deal with the second issue ￿rst. We may write the following empirical model
for PSID observations, wit :
wit = ￿
0
cit + ￿e mit + ￿mt + ￿
0
xt + "t + ￿it; (17)
where wit are individual i￿ s log of wages de￿ ated by the annual CPI in year t (i = 1;:::nt),
cit is a k ￿ 1 vector of individual i￿ s characteristics (6 occupation dummies, sex, 3 race
dummies, tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared, state of residence and 8 education
dummies) at time t, xt is a vector of variables that have direct common in￿ uence on
PSID wages (trend, cyclical variates, etc., to be speci￿ed below) with ￿ = (￿1;￿2:::) and
￿ = (￿1;￿2:::) being a conformable vector of parameters, and e mit = mit￿mt with mit being
the BD measure of individual i0s tightest labor market (i.e., the minimum unemployment
rate) during his current job tenure at time t (￿minu￿ ) and mt being the sample mean of
mit in year t.23 The errors "t = ("1;"2:::"T) and ￿it = (￿11:::￿n11;￿12:::￿n22:::￿1T:::￿nTT) are
assumed to be mean zero i:i:d. Taking annual averages of (17) gives the ￿macro￿model
for PSID wages as
wt = ￿
0
ct + ￿mt + ￿
0






nt contains the annual means of cit. In e⁄ect this means that the only role
of characteristics in the macro model is to allow for year to year compositional changes
in the panel. If for example the 1968 data had a preponderance of professionals but the
1969 data was dominated by unskilled workers, we would expect a drop in wages that
re￿ ects a combination of the change in composition and the wage di⁄erential between
unskilled and professional workers. From the viewpoint of our macro theory we are really
only interested in ￿ and ￿ in (18) because ￿
0
ct merely picks up aggregate wage movements
associated with changes in the mix of characteristics in any particular year in the PSID.
Explicitly we wish to analyse the relative importance of mt and rival macro variables in x
such as trend, the simulated wages from our model and TFP. One obvious and direct way
to do this would be to treat (18) as a simple regression (assuming that the Op(n￿1
t ) terms
are negligible) but there are two problems with this. First we have over 60 characteristics
23Constant terms are subsumed in the characteristic dummies and for simplicity are suppressed in the
notation.
20plus at least two further (macro) regressors but only 26 annual data points. Second,
the left hand side variable wt excludes non wage bene￿ts (pension, health insurance etc.)
which, from arguments given previously, are the relevant compensation measure in the
theory. The answer to the ￿rst conundrum is to exploit the cross section of the panel to
obtain estimates of ￿ and to the second problem is to adjust wages for non wage bene￿ts
using aggregate data. We achieve these aims via two stage estimation. In the ￿rst stage
we estimate (17) but allow ￿mt+￿
0




cit + ￿e mit +
T X
t=1
￿tDt + ￿it; (19)
where Dt takes the value 1 in year t but zero otherwise.24 All of the macro e⁄ects are now
captured in the estimates b ￿t so that we can write
b ￿t = ￿mt + ￿
0
xt + "t + Op(n￿1
t ): (20)
To adjust for non wage bene￿ts we add the BLS measure of the log of the ratio of aggregate
total compensation to wages (rt) to the left hand side of (20), and denote this by b ￿t ￿
b ￿t + rt.
There is reasonably strong evidence that both b ￿t and b ￿t are trend stationary - ADF
statistics (with one augmentation) for the detrended series were borderline signi￿cant for
b ￿t at -3.41 and more robustly signi￿cant for b ￿t at -3.65 respectively when compared with
the critical value of -3.41. It is therefore reasonable to proceed under the trend stationarity
assumption and estimate
b ￿t ￿ b ￿t + rt = ￿mt + ￿
0
xt + "t + Op(n￿1
t ) (21)
free of restrictions. In particular we do not impose the restriction that the coe¢ cient on
mt be equal to ￿ in (19)￿ this allows mt the freedom to have a macroeconomic impact that
is separate from and unconstrained by its cross sectional/within year e⁄ects on individual
workers. Finally and again as a robustness check we also run versions of (21) with b ￿t as the
LHS variable. In BN￿ s model, mt explains b ￿t (or b ￿t) and in our model, because of equal
treatment, only the model predicted wage should matter once individual characteristics
are controlled for.
Figure 3 plots the detrended PSID estimates of total compensation (b ￿d
t) together with
detrended macro minu (md
t) and detrended model predicted total compensation (w￿d
t ).
Visual inspection suggests that the model￿ s predicted total compensation matches the













Figure 3: Detrended estimates of total compensation
dynamics of the PSID estimates rather better than does the macro measure of minu.
More serious is the apparent positive association of mt with PSID total compensation
estimates which is perverse: larger values of the yearly averaged minu should imply lower
total compensation in the year not higher.
Table 2: Annual Time Series Regressions 1968-1993





.021 - - .06
(.017) - -
- 1.093 - .55
- (.201) -
.008 1.065 - .56
(.012) (.209) -
.003 1.007 .597 .65
(.011) (.192) (.250)
LHS Variable b ￿
d
t .019 - - .04
(.019) - -
- 1.153 - .48
- (.244) -
-.001 1.057 .809 .62
(.013) (.227) (.296)
Table 2 gives regression results for a number of versions of (21). The regression of
b ￿d
t on md
t (￿rst line) gives implausible results because the md
t variable is insigni￿cant and
incorrectly signed: the positive coe¢ cient implies that an increase in average minu from
one year to another will lead to higher worker compensation, not lower as the theory would
22suggest. By contrast and turning to lines 3 to 6 of the table the two regressions of b ￿d
t on
w￿d
t and b ￿d
t on md
t and w￿d
t show the model￿ s predicted series to be highly signi￿cant in
explaining total compensation estimated from the PSID. On its own, it captures 55% of
the variation in b ￿t compared with 6% for md
t and has a coe¢ cient very close to unity.
Adding detrended aggregate TFP (yd
t ) to the regression (line 7) adds somewhat to the
explanatory power of the equation but not the size nor signi￿cance of w￿d
t . Although w￿d
t
is substantially more signi￿cant than TFP, this regression does suggest that our model
is some way from being a comprehensive explanation of the dynamic movements in total
compensation￿ not surprising given the simplicity and parsimony of the model.
For completeness we report in lines 9 to 14 the regression of detrended PSID time
e⁄ects unadjusted for non-wage bene￿ts (b ￿
d
t) on md
t (line 9), on w￿d
t (line 11) and on w￿d
t
and md
t (line 13). Overall the results are similar￿ w￿d
t is important and robustly signi￿cant
whilst md
t is insigni￿cant. In sum then our model predictions seem to track the dynamics
of both PSID total compensation and PSID wage measures well.
Finally, as we have just seen, md
t is not signi￿cant in the regressions, despite the fact
that minu is a statistically signi￿cant determinant of individual wages (see Appendix C).
Grant (2003) points out that its importance in accounting for the time series variation
in wages may not be great because the variation in minu over time is not very large. If
we add year dummies to a basic BD regression to absorb macro e⁄ects (hence we regress
log wages on characteristics, minu and year dummies) then we ￿nd, not surprisingly,
that in both the short (BD) and long (68-93) samples minu explains less than 0.5% of
the within year variation in log wages and accounts for less than 1% of the explained
variance of wages in the pooled regression. More important from the macroeconomic
viewpoint is minu￿ s contribution to the year by year/macro movements in log wages.
Trend deviations in mean minu explain only 3.8% of the variation in the trend deviations
of log wages (see Table 2). It must of course be stressed that BD￿ s model is not formulated
to explain macroeconomic phenomena, but to test alternative theories of contracting.
Indeed, in cross section regressions, not reported in detail, minu remains signi￿cant. Thus
it appears successful in explaining di⁄erentials between workers within a year, but it does
not satisfactorily explain year to year movements in real wages.
4 Closing Comments
This paper has analyzed a model in which ￿rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of
entry to a ￿rm. The trading-o⁄ of wage insurance for incumbents against the desire to be
23￿ exible in the hiring wage paid to new hires leads to wages which do not always clear the
labor market. On the other hand, the need to hire means that wages have to respond to
su¢ ciently positive shocks, so that wages in the long-run respond to productivity move-
ments. We ￿nd that these two features imply that the model gives a reasonable account
of unemployment and compensation in recent US history.
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254.1 Appendix A: Su¢ ciency
Assume that the solution satisfying the necessary condition (13) satis￿es (14) (recall that
(15) guarantees this). We show that this is a solution to Problem A; moreover it is a
solution to the problem where layo⁄s are permitted. We shall consider a relaxed version of
the problem faced by a potential deviant ￿rm (i.e., where (￿t)
T
t=1 is ￿xed at the putative
equilibrium levels) and show that this cannot improve on the putative equilibrium and
use this to demonstrate that a deviant cannot do better in Problem A , nor when allows
layo⁄s are allowed. Layo⁄ pay is ruled out for simplicity25 and we assume that a laid-o⁄
worker receives ￿t:
We deal with the case T < 1.26 We consider the problem as formulated earlier, but
in which the ￿rm has no employment constraints, so that it solves Problem A without the
constraint (3) (that is, it can costlessly reduce its workforce at any time, and only has to
respect the participation constraints, which do not take into account layo⁄s, this despite
the fact that a worker in calculating his utility from the contract should take into account
the layo⁄ possibility). We call this Problem AR: We also consider the problem in which
layo⁄s are permitted (these could be cohort dependent), but in which workers do factor
in layo⁄ probabilities into their calculations; this is the natural economic problem and we
call it Problem B (for brevity￿ s sake we omit its statement).
Consider the static problem of maximizing pro￿ts given that workers receive utility
u, so that w = ((1 ￿ ￿)u)
1=(1￿￿). Substituting from (11) for N (this must hold in the
static problem), yields pro￿ts of









As ￿￿ > 1, this is a strictly concave function of u. We can formulate Problem AR faced











subject to ~ Vt (ht) ￿ ￿(ht) (23)
for all positive probability ht;T ￿ t ￿ 1, where












Thus the maximand is strictly concave and the constraints are linear. The Slater condition
is satis￿ed by, for all ht, ut(ht) = u(w￿(ht) + "), for " > 0. Moreover it is straightforward
25Allowing for layo⁄ pay raises the possibility that the ￿rm may want to replace its entire workforce in
bad states in order to bene￿t from low outside wages. In the absence of layo⁄ pay the incumbents will
factor this into their calculations when deciding whether to join the ￿rm, and there can be no bene￿t
from this to the ￿rm (since an equivalent policy would be to retain the incumbents and to o⁄er them a
continuation utility of ￿t). If the ￿rm could insure the incumbents it lays o⁄, however, then the picture
is less clear cut. Nevertheless, when a bad shock occurs, if the ￿rm is downsizing, as is likely to be the
case, it cannot bene￿t from replacing its workforce. Alternatively, we could introduce turnover costs which
would render such a strategy unpro￿table.
26If T = 1, then by the assumption on ￿f; we can show that pro￿ts are ￿nite and standard arguments
can be used to extend the ￿nite horizon argument.
26to show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satis￿ed at the putative equilibrium, hence
the necessary conditions developed in the text are su¢ cient for existence in the relaxed
problem.
Thus provided (14) holds, a solution to Problem AR exists and coincides with the
solution to Problem A, and is the one we identi￿ed. Consider now a feasible plan in
Problem B which involves layo⁄s occurring. Suppose we implement the same wage (i.e.,
utility) plan in Problem AR; (23) must hold given that any cohort facing a layo⁄probability
in Problem B will get weakly less continuation utility than ~ Vt: Since, given wt; and hence
ut, per-period pro￿ts are maximized in Problem AR; the solution to the latter must weakly
dominate the solution to Problem B. Putting this together, if (14) holds, our solution is
also a solution to Problem B.
4.2 Appendix B: ￿At Will￿Contracting Implies Equal Treatment
We maintain the assumption that the ￿rm can commit to wages, which here includes
commitment to the contracts of cohorts yet to be hired, but it cannot commit not to
replace workers. We show that it is optimal to commit to a single wage policy, and that
our solution for the equal treatment case remains a solution with potential discrimination.
For simplicity we treat the case of T ￿nite (although the argument can be extended to
T = 1):
Potentially a contract now will depend on the entry date to the ￿rm, so the wage
at t of a cohort entering at ￿ ￿ t is denoted w￿
t ; with N￿




t (ht) now denotes aggregate employment at the ￿rm. We write a wage














t ] for all ￿ ￿ t; t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1. We allow for layo⁄s: a ￿￿cohort








for ￿ < t (this assumes no quits at t + 1); this combines both the exogenous separation
rate and any enforced terminations. Given (!;￿), V ￿
t (ht;!;￿) is the cohort￿ s continuation
utility from remaining with the ￿rm at t which takes into account the termination and
quitting possibilities (we de￿ne it for a worker at t who will not be laid o⁄ nor quit at t),
de￿ned recursively as:
V ￿
t (ht;!;￿) = u(w￿



















T+1;￿T+1 ￿ 0: If V ￿
t < ￿t then the worker is better o⁄ quitting at t.27 V ￿
t is
de￿ned after ht such that N￿
t (ht) > 0. If N￿
t (ht) = 0 (i.e., the cohort is not employed on
the equilibrium path after ht), however, we need to de￿ne V ￿
t in case the ￿rm deviates.
For simplicity we assume that in this case workers are pessimistic and always assume that
they will be replaced in the following period, although the results do not depend on this.28
Problem A of Section 2 can be reformulated with cohort dependent wages and em-




























: The argument is hardest to prove under these pessimistic beliefs.
27subject to
~ Nt(ht￿1;s) ￿ ￿ ~ Nt￿1(ht￿1) (26)
for all positive probability (ht￿1;s); T ￿ t ￿ 1; and to the cohort speci￿c participation
constraint, for all ￿ ￿ t; all positive probability ht;T ￿ t ￿ 1; all ￿ such that ~ N￿
t > 0:
V ￿
t (ht;!;￿) ￿ ￿t (ht): (27)
(27) restricts employment to cohorts satisfying the participation constraint calculated on


















￿ 2 ￿(!;￿): (28)
(28) requires not only that the appropriate participation constraints are satis￿ed, but that
the plan is credible, since the ￿rm cannot commit to its employment policies; otherwise, for
example, it may commit to paying high wages to a cohort at the end of their employment,
and then replace the cohort with cheaper new hires when the high wages kick in.
Proposition 5 A solution to Problem A (i.e., an optimum under equal treatment) is also
a solution to Problem A￿(i.e., when wages can vary across cohorts).
Proof. The main argument is to show that the ￿rm does not su⁄er by committing
to a single wage contract. (1) Let (~ !;~ ￿) be a solution to Problem A￿ . Suppose that (~ !;~ ￿)
involves cohort 1 being (possibly partially) ousted or quitting at some ht; t > 1 (i.e.,
N1
t < ￿N1
t￿1); by (26) this implies Nt
t > 0. We change the contract as follows: replace
the continuation contract from ht of cohort 1 by that of cohort t, and retain all of cohort
1; holding total employment Nt constant (feasible by (26)), unless the ousting is partial
and the continuation contract from ht of cohort 1 o⁄ers higher continuation utility than
that of the new hire contract, in which case make no change. In the former case if on any
continuation path after ht cohort t is ousted or quits at t0 > t, we repeat the exercise,
replacing the (new) continuation contract from ht0 of cohort 1 by that of cohort t0; in the
latter case do the same but for cohort 1 instead (i.e., if the remainder of cohort 1 was
replaced at t0 > t in the original contract). This process is repeated until T. Denote by
(the random variable) ￿(t) the cohort at time t whose wage is selected by this contract
replacement process (so that ￿(t) = 1 until the ￿rst replacement occurs at time t0 > 1; say,
then ￿(t) = t0 from t = t0 until the next replacement, etc.). Next, we replace the contract
of each cohort ￿ > 1 by the continuation of cohort 1￿ s (new) contract, thus creating an
equal treatment contract. And ~ ￿ is changed as follows: in the previous step we held N1
1
constant, and thereafter retained the entire cohort (so N1
t+1 = ￿N1
t ). Now adjust N2
2 so
that total employment N2 ￿ N1
2 + N2
2 is constant, thereafter retaining the entire cohort,
and so on, so that Nt is unchanged at all t (feasible by (26)). Call this new contract and
employment plan (^ !;^ ￿).
(2) We show that the cost of each new cohort under (~ !;~ ￿) is at least the cost of
any retained incumbent cohort, so total costs cannot rise under (^ !;^ ￿), and as output
is held constant, pro￿ts cannot fall; moreover participation constraints are satis￿ed. In
more detail: We can de￿ne the minimum cost of retaining a member of cohort ￿ ￿ t at t
recursively as follows. C￿
T (hT; ~ !;~ ￿) = ~ w￿
T if ~ N￿
T > 0 and 1 otherwise. C￿





T (~ !;~ ￿);CT
T (~ !;~ ￿)g j hT￿1
￿
if ~ N￿
T￿1 > 0 and 1 otherwise; in general,
28C￿




t+1 (~ !;~ ￿);Ct+1
t+1 (~ !;~ ￿)g j ht
￿
if ~ N￿
t > 0 and 1 otherwise.
This can be interpreted as the cost of retaining a ￿-cohort worker given that in future she
will be replaced by any cheaper cohorts, where potential replacement cohorts are restricted
to those actually hired under (~ !;~ ￿). It must be the case that
C￿
t (~ !;~ ￿) ￿ Ct
t (~ !;~ ￿) (29)
if ~ N￿
t > 0; otherwise it would be cheaper to replace this cohort at t. To see this, start at
T: clearly (29) holds since ~ w￿
T ￿ ~ wT
T for any employed cohort ￿, assuming ~ NT
T > 0 so the
participation constraint is satis￿ed for new hires (if ~ NT
T = 0 then CT
T (~ !;~ ￿) = 1; so again
(29) holds). At T ￿1 suppose that ~ N￿
T￿1 > 0; but that C￿
T￿1 (~ !;~ ￿) > CT￿1
T￿1 (~ !;~ ￿) (so that
~ NT￿1
T￿1 > 0). Then the fraction ￿ of cohort ￿ who survive to T; or their replacements at T
(by (26)), are paid under ~ ! at least minfC￿
T (~ !;~ ￿);CT
T (~ !;~ ￿)g; so that the cost discounted
to T￿1 is at least C￿
T￿1 (~ !;~ ￿); while they could be replaced at T￿1 at a cost of CT￿1
T￿1 (~ !;~ ￿)
(since only employed cohorts are used, this new employment plan satis￿es (27)), hence
costs are not minimized, so ~ ! = 2 ￿(~ !;~ ￿); a contradiction. A similar argument applies at
all earlier dates. Likewise, if cohort ￿ is partially replaced at t; (29) holds with equality.
Now consider (^ !; ^ v). Cohort 1￿ s contract must satisfy29
C1
t (^ !;^ ￿) ￿ Ct
t (~ !;~ ￿) (30)
at all t since C1
T (^ !;^ ￿) = C
￿(T)
T (~ !;~ ￿), and working backwards, C1
T￿1 (^ !;^ ￿) = C
￿(T￿1)
T￿1 (~ !;~ ￿)
as any states at T at which replacements occur (￿ (T) = T) must satisfy C
￿(T￿1)
T (~ !;~ ￿) ￿
CT
T (~ !;~ ￿); etc. So C1
t (^ !;^ ￿) = C
￿(t)
t (~ !;~ ￿) ￿ Ct
t (~ !;~ ￿) by (29) as N
￿(t)
t > 0 by de￿nition of
￿ (t). Now consider, at any t, net hires (after exogenous separation) ~ Nt ￿￿ ~ Nt￿1. Because
of (26) we can follow this group (declining in size at rate ￿) through to T, allowing for
replacements (if there is partial replacement then this may not be unique, but this is
inconsequential). The per worker cost at t associated with this group is Ct
t (~ !;~ ￿) (it
cannot be lower by de￿nition of Ct
t (~ !;~ ￿); if it is greater costs are not being minimized).
Hence under (^ !;^ ￿), the cost of each group of net hires of size ^ Nt ￿ ￿ ^ Nt￿1(= ~ Nt ￿ ￿ ~ Nt￿1)
is no higher by (30), and so total costs are no higher. Finally, cohort 1￿ s participation
constraint is satis￿ed at all t under (^ !;^ ￿) since if complete replacement occurs under (~ !;~ ￿);
the substitution contract in the construction must yield at least ￿t while the ousted or
quitting cohort receives exactly ￿t, and if substitution is partial, the construction gives
the higher of the two continuation utilities. Consequently the participation constraint is
satis￿ed for all employed cohorts ￿.
(3) Take a solution to Problem A, say (!0;￿0) in the current notation. Any ￿00 which
satis￿es (26) and (27) for (!0;￿0) would also satisfy (2) and (3) for !0 in Problem A (if
replacement occurs in ￿00 this can be eliminated as above; if ￿00 involves employment of
a cohort not employed under ￿0; the participation constraint (2) is satis￿ed since it is
satis￿ed for the equal treatment contract at all dates) and so cannot o⁄er higher pro￿ts.
Thus ￿0 2 ￿(!0;￿0), so (!0;￿0) is a candidate solution to Problem A￿ . Equally, since (^ !;^ ￿)
satis￿es (2) and (3), it is a candidate solution to Problem A so the solution to Problem
A must yield at least the pro￿ts from (^ !;^ ￿) and hence from (~ !;~ ￿); the optimum. Thus
(!0;￿0) o⁄ers the same pro￿ts as (~ !;~ ￿) and is optimal in Problem A￿ .
Thus the solution to the equal treatment problem derived in Section 2 remains a
solution without the equal treatment restriction provided contracts are ￿at will￿ .30
29C
1
t (^ !;^ ￿) is just the cost from t associated with a continuously employed worker in the equal treatment
contract ^ ! as there are no layo⁄s or quits.
30I.e., under the parameter restrictions given by (15), so that (26) is not binding in the putative solution.
Su¢ ciency can be handled as in Appendix A.
294.3 Appendix C: Beaudry-DiNardo Regressions
Several empirical studies (see Introduction) have largely con￿rmed the robustness of BD￿ s
main empirical ￿ndings that the minimum rate of unemployment since hiring is a statis-
tically important determinant of the current wage of an individual. In particular Grant
(2003) extends BD￿ s analysis (using six cohorts from the National Longitudinal Surveys)
to cover the time period 1966 to 1998. He ￿nds that the signi￿cance and importance of
minu is broadly robust with respect to the addition of ￿xed time e⁄ects and using sub-
samples selected on the basis of age, and sex, although current unemployment levels also
have some explanatory power. Here, we perform a similar exercise on our data, which as
already noted, considerably extends the BD years.
Table 3 gives the results for a BD style regression of log real hourly wages on char-
acteristics (see Section 3.2), minu (mit) and BD￿ s two other ￿competitor￿labor market
condition variates, namely, the unemployment rate at the date of hiring (u0it) and the
current unemployment rate (unt), for the BD years and our full sample.31 Despite some
di⁄erences in data construction and characteristics used we see that our results are quite
close to those found by BD and particularly so for the key variate minu itself. In fur-
ther regressions (not reported here but available on request), we follow Grant in ￿nding
that the results are qualitatively robust with respect to the addition of a trend and year
dummies￿ minu is always negative, highly signi￿cant and with a coe¢ cient value between
-.02 to -.06 with u0it and unt (obviously we drop the latter when year dummies are added)
poorly determined and often incorrectly signed.
Table 3: BD Pooled Regressions
mit u0t ut












Finally we report one further robustness test for the BD theory. When we apply
a BD regression to new hires only (over the full time period), the coe¢ cient on minu
(which in this case is just u0it, the current unemployment rate) falls to below -.01 and is
insigni￿cant. In our data this is a robust ￿nding.
31BD also assess the impact of including ￿xed e⁄ects which are absent in our analysis. However they
￿nd that adding these terms changes the results little. Grant uses ￿xed e⁄ects in all speci￿cations, and
argues that their inclusion tends to increase the signi￿cance of current unemployment.
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